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Gene V Glass 
Testing Old, Testing New: 
Schoolboy Psychology and 
the Allocation of Intellectual 
Resources 
University of Colorado, Boulder 
There will be no divining of the future here- no megatrends, no reference to 
Orwell (except this one) . What little we truly know about the future does not bear 
mentioning. Nor shall I refer to micro-computers, data banks, and other gaudy 
paraphernalia that the future holds for us. The future is best seen in a rear-view 
mirror. We can at least hope to see more clearly the recent past we have tra-
versed. Appearances of rapid change are usually superficial. If we see the past 
and present clearly, we will know as much of our future as it is ever permitted us 
to know . 
Kenneth Boulding (1968) contends that the discovery of knowledge is abso-
lutely unpredictable, since knowledge is the one thing that if we could predict 
when we would discover it we would have it already. The evolution of a tech-
nology , if it were not really radically new, might be predicted with some success; 
but then, if we can't predict the discovery of new knowledge and we can on ly 
predict changes in ordinary technology , then surely we have little idea of the 
important changes that lie ahead. New knowledge is revolutionary; technology is 
Establishment. The discovery of knowledge upsets things , changes the way lives 
are led. Technology serves old entrenched interests and established institutions. 
The glacial evolution of testing in this century reveals the source of its mo-
mentum- new technologies are moving it , not new knowledge. Testing is the 
conservative wing of the Social Science party . 
A Point of View: Abstracted Empiricism 
The most revealing perspective to ass ume for viewing the evolution and the 
current condition of testing is that which affords the clearest picture of how 
testing relates to the basic disciplines in the study of human behavior. In the last 
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100 years, testing has moved gradually from the center to the periphery of the 
behavioral and social sciences. Once an integral part of the best thinking on 
human development and behavior , testing' has progressively grown more inbred 
and dissociated from the leading theoretical positions in psychology and the 
soc ial sciences. In its position at the margin , testing has come to serve more 
faithfully the goals of its own professional subculture and of a particular political 
subculture (i.e., its own inte llectual Establishment and the professional-manage-
rial Establishment) than to serve the ends of science and the true aims of educa-
tion . To fulfill its promise, testing must find its way back to the center of 
psychological thinking. 
My message here does little more than echo a theme sounded by Anne 
Anastasi (1967) in her 1966 presidential address to Division 5 of the American 
Psychological Association . 
. . . psychological testing is becoming dissociated from the mainstream of contem-
porary psychology. Those psychologists spec ializing in psychometrics have been 
devoting more and more of the ir efforts to refining the techniques of test construc-
tion , while losing sight of the behavior they set out to measure. Psychological testing 
today places too much emphasis on testing and too little on psychology. As a result, 
outdated interpretations of tes t performance may remain insulated from the impact of 
subsequent behavior research. It is my contention that the isolat ion of psychometrics 
from other relevant areas of psychology is one of the conditions that have led to the 
prevalent public hostility toward test ing (p. 297) . Although the very essence of 
psychological testing is the measurement of behavior, testing today is not adequate ly 
ass imil ating relevant developments from the science of behavior . . .. 
It is noteworthy that the term " test theory" generally refers to the mechanics of 
test construction , such as the nature of the score scale and the procedures for 
assessing reliability and validity. The term does not customarily refer to psycholog-
ical theory about the behavior under consideration. Psychometricians appear to 
shed much of the ir psychological knowledge as they concentrate upon the minutiae 
of elegant statistical techniques . Moreover, when other types of psychologists use 
standardized tests in their work, they too show a tendency to slip down several 
notches in psychological sophistication (p. 300). 
Anastasi saw several reasons for this unfortunate dissociation of psychologi-
cal measurement from psychological theory. Increasing specialization in all dis-
ciplines has lessened the chances that one individual will be conversant with both 
the technical rigmarole that has come to characterize modern psychometrics and 
the theories of psychology themselves. The expense involved in developing 
major tests militates against changing them; thus the tests of today reflect the 
psychology of yesterday. Psychometricians have capitulated to unrealistic public 
demands for short cuts and magic- psychological theory is often ravaged in the 
process. 
Four years ago, also on the occasion of an American Psychological Associa-
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tion Division 5 presidential address, Robert Glaser (1981) voiced the same 
concern expressed by Anastasi 15 years earlier: Testing is estranged from its 
roots in psychological theory . In the written version of hi s address entitled "The 
Future of Testing: A Research Agenda for Cognitive Psychology and Psycho-
metrics," Glaser attempted to present " ... areas of soc ial concern in which 
education and testing might profit from coordination with potentially helpful 
areas of psychological research" (p . 935). Glaser applied his understanding of 
recent advances in cognitive psychology to a critique of ex isting school testing 
practices and pointed toward useful applications of recent developments in the 
psychology of learning and thinking . The work of Brown and Burton (1978) and 
of Siegler (1976) was suggested as a bas is for ways of diagnosing failures in 
learning and intellectual performance. Herbert Simon 's (Simon & Chase, 1973) 
imag inative research on the nature of expertise was advanced as a beginning in 
the assessment of differences in knowledge structures and cognitive processes 
between novices and experts. The work of Hunt , Sternberg, and others suggested 
to Glaser new views on the assessment of aptitudes with the ultimate goal of 
altering and building those abilities that early-day psychologists were prone to 
accept as being immutable. 
My proposed point of criticism would seem ad hoc and unconvincing if it 
were said to apply somehow uniquely to the problems of measurement and 
testing. Fortunately, such is not so. C. Wright Mills (1959) argued forcefully that 
the schism between method and theory is everywhere evident in the social 
sciences. Aimless fact finding unguided by worthy conceptual analysis was 
christened "abstracted empiricism" by Mills. Once severed from worthwhile 
theoretical thinking, abstracted empiricism follows a bureaucratic course of 
development. 
I doubt that I can advance any more helpful message than to commend once 
more to your attention the wisdom in the observations of my respected colleagues 
Anastasi and Glaser. It will give me the greatest satisfaction , in addition , if I can 
convince you to entertain an even broader scope of relevant psychological theory 
than they imagined as being a proper mooring place for psychological and 
educational measurement. But before mak ing that attempt , permit me first to 
recount briefly how testing came to assume its current condition, which more 
people agree with each passing year is in need of repair. 
Psychology and Psychometrics in 1980: The Golden 
Days 
Testing as we have known it for the past 75 years was originally the tool of 
psychologists and social sc ientists living through the denouement of the great 
Western European empires. The soc ial sc ientists of the first two decades of thi s 
century were, with varying degrees of consc iousness, Social Darwinists . The 
cultural relativist anthropologists, such as Boaz and later Mead , are the excep-
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tions that prove the rule. Regardless of one's contemporary political leanings, it 
is difficult today to read Galton or Terman without blanching at the coarse 
ugliness of it, e.g., Galton (1892) analyzing the genetic superiority of one (19th-
century English) village over its neighbor. But enough has been written about 
this embarrass ing era in the history of psychometrics (Block & Dworkin, 1976; 
Fallows, 1980; Gould , 1981) , and I do not bring it up here again to heap insult on 
contumely . I I want instead to praise testing of that time; for in spite of its 
grossness then, it had something that it lost soon after and is missing today. At 
least the concern with measurement of human behavior in the early stages of its 
hi story was allied with the best thinking of the time on psychology and so-
ciology, i. e, with evolution by natural selection , with the attempt to apply ideas 
of biological evolution to culture and society. This was more true, of course, of 
the European psychometricians than the Americans; as Sizer (1970, p. 15) ob-
served: " . . . Americans engineered the idea of mental testing and adapted late 
nineteenth-century European theories to the realities of a more modern America . 
Terman, Thorndike, and the rest were pioneers, but more as engineers than as 
theoreticians." It would indeed be an act of insensitive second-guessing to think 
that Galton and Spearman and Goddard and Terman and the others were wrong 
and should have known better. They may well have been wrong, just as our best 
theories will seem puerile to future sc ientists, but they were the lead ing psychol-
ogists and social scientists of their day and testing was their most useful tool. It 
was, I submit, testing's golden era, and it has not known their like since . 
Perhaps, as with the triumphs of a precocious child , testing's early successes led 
to its current difficulties. The techno logy of testing was quickly wedded to the 
burgeoning field of statistical methods. The discipline began to grow specialized 
and esoteric. In the 1920s, testing entered a stage of hyper-rationali zation from 
which it has never re-emerged . Multiple factor analysis plumbed the " vectors of 
the mind" (Thurstone, 1935) with machinery (centroids, tetrads, reference sys-
tems, etc.) beyond the ken of psychologist and soc ial scientist. It is of more than 
passing significance that the increase in technical sophistication of the testing 
movement had little effect on tests themselves or the theories on which they were 
based. I cannot, for example, discern Thurstone or Holzinger's lineaments in any 
of the contemporary tests of intelligence. Indeed, the modern intelligence scale 
would seem a familiar artifact if placed in the hands of a suddenly reincarnated 
psychologist of the Edwardian period. I know of no sc ience- save perhaps, 
anthropology or history-about which the same could be said . 
The development of psychometrics from its early triumphs to the modern era 
parallels, peculiarly enough , the birth and growth of a bureaucratic agency-
I For the most recent chapte r in this hi storica l controversy , see Snyderman and Herrnstein (19B3) , 
who argue that , in spite of the raci st character of much of the psychometrics of the earl y part of this 
century, it is doubtful that the research directly influenced the passage of the Immigration Act of 
1924. Their apologia reminds one of the man who, when acc used of murdering three men and a dog, 
forthwith produced (before the court) in hi s defe nse the dog ali ve. 
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there are, indeed, lest anyone doubt it , bureaucracies and bureaucrats of ideas. It 
is a natural and human failing when one has access to and control over spe-
cialized information to exert that control against change (Selznick, 1953). Tech-
nological society's emphas is on expertise and special ization produce trained 
incompetence, the narrowing of the scope permitted for intellectual experimenta-
tion. Psychometricians, with control over arcane corners of mathematics, ex-
emplify forces such as these (Andresky, 1972). As Robert Merton (1975) ob-
served, the speciali st begins to resist change because of vested interest in ... the 
current structure, of a soc iety or cu lture, whether material or intellectual. "Ad-
herence to the rules, originally conceived as a means , becomes transformed into 
an end- in-itse lf; there occurs the familiar process of displacement of goals, 
whereby an instrumental value becomes a terminal value . . . " (p . 28). 
This displacement of goals took place in testing between about 1940 and 1960 
as nearly as I can judge . Spurred by what we are told were the great victories for 
testing in World War II (Chase, 1948), all of which were atheoretical and 
pragmatic, the discipline of psychometrics began to take shape apart from psy-
chology . It turned its back on psychology and reached instead for an indepen-
dent, autonomous set of "principles of measurement" that transcended every-
thing in particular. I remember my delight in discovering in 1960 that I could 
read with nearly complete comprehension the great treatise on psychometrics , 
Gulliksen's Theory of Mental Tests [1950], simply because I had overlearned 
college math and knew less than nothing at all about psychology. 
The development of reliability and validity theory- two of the greatest 
achievements of the psychometric movement- can be viewed as an over-am-
bitious attempt to axiomatize a discipline. I view Cronbach's work over the past 
two decades (and in particular his coll aboration with Meehl [Cronbach & Meehl, 
1955]) as an attempt to correct the errant ways of methodologists who fe lt they 
could safely leave substance behind in the search for the abstract foundations of 
measurement. It took a while to drive home the point that the validity of testing is 
a quality of a complex use of information; it is not a property of a random 
variable. It has taken longer to make the point that reliability is no different, and 
just as a test has no validity, so it has no realiability either. Measurements have 
meanings, and they permit or obstruct thinking to various degrees. The process 
by which measurements are taken , as well as the ideas that gave rise to the 
measurements, are only judged in accord with how both- ideas and measure-
ments- lead toward greater understanding. The relationship is reciprocal: con-
structs and observations , meanings and methods . The message is Cronbach and 
Meehl's . 
By the early 1960s, it is fa ir to say that testing in psychology and education 
was severed from its roots in the study of human behavior. Indeed , testing 
flourishes today where the environment is starkly atheoretical (education) and 
withers in precisely those loca les where thinking about human behavior is fresh-
est and most exciting (psychology , psychiatry). 
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The Modern Testing Establishment 
What then has become of testing and measurement? Estranged from the behav-
ioral and social sciences, grown mathematically elaborate and worshipful of the 
"general principles of measurement," what has become of testing since it 
reached maturity and autonomy in the academies of post-World War II America 
and Europe? In short, it sold out to the highest bidder; it went Establishment. In 
the world of work and in education, testing stepped forward to play the role of 
gatekeeper and management tool in the processing of human lives for the mer-
itocracy: professional lightning rod attracting and grounding the anger of the 
excluded and discarded; factotum for society's dirty work. 
The testing industry and, more regrettably, the discipline of measurement in 
the Academy no longer serve science in its search for understanding nor educa-
tion in its search to educe from individuals that which is best in them. In-
creasingly they serve a national and international system of processing people by 
number, managing the flow of bodies from institution to institution, document-
ing the expected progress of pupils through the vast educational ' 'system." For 
its efforts, the psychometric industry with its academic support system acquires 
huge caches of unexpended income . 
The lack of articu lation between measurement and substantive theory is par-
ticularly serious in education, that most pragmatic and atheoretical of all disci -
plines where testing is applied. Achievement test batteries are designed around 
what is thought to be the content of the school curriculum as determined by 
surveys of textbooks, teachers and other tests. Textbooks and curricula are 
designed , on the other hand, in part around the content of tests. One cannot 
discern which side leads and which follows; each side influences the other, yet 
nothing assures us that both are tied to an intelligent conceptualization of what an 
educated person ought to be . 
Considering the prominence of testing in contemporary American schools, it 
is amazing to realize how useless testing seems to those closest to the core of 
schooling: teachers and pupils. It is scarcely any secret that teachers regard 
standardized abi lity and achievement tests as an irrelevance or worse. They 
complain that they learn nothing from the results that wasn't obvious before the 
test was given; the scores give no clue as to what should be done to eradicate 
ignorance or take advantage of talent and ski ll. Testing is a transaction between 
the testing companies and school administrators, state education officials , gov-
ernment agencies, lawyers and other middlemen in the system of schooling. 
Tests are not used by educators to decide how children should be educated 
because they are not designed for such purposes and are virtually worthless 
toward such ends (Hawkins, 1977). This fact greatly concerned Oscar Buros 
(1977) who decried the drifting away of achievement tests from what was taught 
in a course toward the goal of predicting individual differences in attainment at 
higher grades. After two decades of research on aptitude-treatment interactions, 
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it remains unclear whether one ought to teach so as to utilize the person 's 
strongest aptitude, or teach so as to compensate for the weakest aptitude, or both 
or neither; and perhaps the meager harvest of so much research should be blamed 
on the primitive concepts of aptitude on which the tests are based. Glaser ( 198 1) 
has complained for decades that tests are useless for dec iding what it is that a 
child can and cannot do , hence the need to reference the scale that a test creates 
to the criterion of skill s, knowledges, and understandings that comprise whatever 
it is that we think of as facility in reading, math , science and the like. The 
di stortion of this eminently sensible call for "criterion referenced testing" (now 
repeated in hopes of productive hybridization of education and cognitive psy-
chology [Glaser, 1981]) into item banks for behavioral objectives with cut-off 
scores for mastery is one of the more unfortunate inventions of modern psycho-
metrics. My colleague David Hawkins at the University of Colorado reached 
back to Dewey in making a similar argument in his brilliant little book , The 
Science and Ethics of Equality (1 977 , p. 75): 
.. . we need a framework of general ideas adequate to the deve lopmental perspec-
tive in which a ll important abilities and talents should be viewed. This means that 
we should dig under the surface of those tests which have provided the empirical 
basis for so much of statistical psychometrics, and specifically the various inte l-
ligence tests ... . I do not want to beat the IQ tests over the head. T hey are useful 
in the ir way, though as John Dewey said more than once, they are of little use to 
good teachers, who need both a refinement and an immediacy of discrimination in 
the ir daily work with children which global test averages do not provide. 
Gullickson [1 983] surveyed 30 education professors and 400 teachers to re-
cord their priorities for the content of educational measurement courses. Of 50 
topics rated for des ired emphas is in a college course, the greatest di screpancies 
between pro fessors and teachers emerged on these topics: Teachers wished for 
"great emphasis" to be placed on ways of " interviewing pupils and parents," 
" observing pupils' work habits," evaluating' 'class discuss ions" and " interper-
sonal relationships"; the professors rated these topics as deserving only "slight 
emphasis." (In fact, these items were among the top ten rated items by the 
teachers and among the professors ' bottom ten! The professo rs' highest rated 
topics were calculating the mean and variance and calculating correlation 
coeffi cients. ) 
The contemporary problem of " learning disabilities" is a case that can be 
advanced in behalf of the argument that testing in education follows the wrong 
lights and serves the wrong masters. Measurement of LD is virtually uniformly 
pursued across the United States today. IQ and achievement test scores are 
compared and "significant discrepancies" are tagged as evidence of LD (Shep-
ard , Smith , & Voj ir, 1983; Smith , 1982). The use of available published tests to 
do this work is encouraged by many factors: they are legally defensible, they 
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seem scientific and unimpeachable to parents, they are cheap and quick. But they 
are being used to measure what was called " under-achievement" three decades 
ago. Learning disapility or lack of motivation? Can anyone tell the difference? 
Well, of course, but not in the naive and mechanical way that these notions are 
being translated into numbers by clinicians and psychometricians. It doesn' t 
matter in the least whether one regards LD as "euphemizing" or not; the peri-
odic purging of dysphemisms like " retardate" or "slow learner" would only 
seem unnecessary to one who had never been called such things. The whole idea 
of " learning di sabilities" is that obstacles to learning are more variegated and 
worthy of detailed analysis than being ascribed to dullness or low intelligence. It 
is manifest that learning involves the hardware of the brain and of the commu-
nication channels; and when learn ing goes wrong, these as well as what a child 
has experienced in both his distant and recent hi story are implicated . From thi s 
point, the work of psychiatry , medicine, cognitive psychology and the like must 
beg in , and what we know of the technology of measurement may have a contri-
bution to make . But the absurdly premature translation of ill-formed concepts of 
LD into IQ versus achievement di screpancies was a managerial expedient of a 
particularly mindless sort , motivated by legal, political and profess ional in-
terests. Unfortunately , it was all too typical of how these interests have used 
educational measurement . 
Testing has found a new market in minimal competence testing in education 
and in licensure and certification in the workplace . I regard both of these with 
disappointment or di sdain (Getz & Glass , 1979; Glass, 1978; Glass, 1979; 
Hogan, 1983; Olson, 1983). I need not go into details of these unseemly busi-
nesses. Perhaps it is enough to go on record again as be lieving that both applica-
tions of testing serve crass political ends: One, the ex tension of centralized 
political control of education ; the other, the protection of economic self-interest 
in the workplace . Neither (and thi s goes for academic selection as well) is based 
on proof of utility that would justify its negative consequences in denial of 
opportunities or restri ction of free trade. 
Recently after reviewing and integrating the findings of over 500 psycho-
therapy outcome experiments, my co lleagues and I (Smith, Glass, & Miller, 
1980, p. 187) remarked thus on the state of the research art in this area: 
Psychotherapy-outcome research lacks nothing by way of differenti ated interven-
tions. The literature on treatme nt is a veritable pharmacopoeia of prescriptions. The 
design of contro lled experimentation has been refined to a sc ie nce that is within the 
grasp of any researcher who owns a tab le of random digits and recogni zes the 
difference between blind and sighted assessment. However, the measurement of 
outcomes seems to have been abandoned at a primitive stage in its development. 
Rating scales are thrown together with little concern expressed for the ir psycho-
metric properties. Venerable paper-and-pencil tests ... with roots planted vaguely 
in no particular theory of pathology or treatment are used to hunt for effects of 
short-term and highly specialized brands of psychotherapy. A superfluity of instru-
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ments ex ists, and too little is known about them to prefer one to another . Little is 
known about their structure , and less is known about their sens itivity to treatment. 
Thinking back to both of the Coleman et al. (1966; 1982) studies (of equality 
of educational opportunity and of public and private schools), the Follow-
Through evaluation (House , G lass, McLean, & Walker, 1978) and more, I 
worry that modern testing and measurement- with their overweaning attention 
to the pragmatic, the conventional, the traditional - have too often not merely 
failed to reveal the complexity and subtlety of human experience, but have 
actually denigrated the value of attempts to improve it. The telescoping of the 
immense variety in the Fo llow-Through models down into a standardized basic 
ski lls test and two dubious "affective" measures was a travesty for which the 
psychometric community might hold certain bureaucrats responsible (House et 
aI. , 1978) , but the bureaucrats in question are quick to respond to such charges 
that they chose the measures from among the best that the psychometric arts had 
to offer. 
BR INGIN G MEASUREMENT BACK TO PSYCHOLOGY: 
TOWARD A SOLUTION 
Case Study Research 
The growing significance of the naturalistic or "case-study" methodology in the 
social sc iences poses important new problems for measurements; and if these 
problems are accorded the attention they deserve, the benefits may accrue not 
just to naturalistic methods but to measurement itself throughout the social sc i-
ences. The translation of experience into an observational record- everywhere 
the fundamental problem in measurement- always requires the imposition of 
some explanatory , theoretical structure. We tend to forget or ignore this fact in 
the established areas of testing and measurement, and then we accept the the-
oretical structure (bequeathed to our generation by faculty psychology or "self-
concept" psychology) not as suppos ition but as reality . This bit of self-deception 
is more difficult to maintain in naturalistic research where experience is more 
complex and different theoretical systems sti ll compete for favor. The natu-
rali st ic scene focuses our attention on several of the problems that need to be 
addressed by measurement theorists across the entire range of behavioral and 
social sc iences: the necessary tie between theoretical structure and observation; 
the problems of not oversimplifying , of doing justice to the complexity of human 
systems (whether they be at the leve l of the individual, the group or a whole 
society); the difficulty of "slicing up the raw behavioral flux" and translating it 
into observations or numbers (Meehl, 1978); the unique problems attendant upon 
the use of human observers of human behavior (i. e., the problems of Verstehen 
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(Dilthey, 1959- 68) or countertransference as behavioral science method as De-
vereux (1967) has written of it). These, I submit, are the key methodological 
problems that measurement must face if it is to further- rather than retard or 
play only a superfluous role in-the progress of the social sciences. 
Theoret ical Possibilities 
While I take some comfort in knowing that my observations about what is wrong 
with testing today were seen earlier by my esteemed colleagues Anastasi and 
Glaser among other references, I shall derive more satisfaction if I can broaden 
ever so slightly the range of psychological theory to which testing and measure-
ment would do well to attend . My colleagues have emphasized cognition and its 
role in learning. It is true that Anastasi mentioned the importance of attending to 
developments in personality theory, but she singled none out, advising her lis-
tener rather to keep abreast of relevant research in clinical and social psychology. 
I wish to go further and counsel my fellow educationists and psychometricians 
that the most exciting and productive thinking outside the area of cognitive 
psychology is virtually untouched by psychometrics and that we could do less 
well than to turn our attention there when we seek the path back to the best 
scientific thinking on human behavior. The "affective domain," as it is so 
inappropriately named, was not addressed by Anastasi or Glaser, and I take it as 
a favor that they have left it to me to extend their thesis into this challenging 
domain of human motives, desires, fears, wishes, antipathies, hopes, and 
frustrations. 
Anastasi (1967) bowed in the direction of "personality" assessment in her 
1967 address, but it seemed a hesitant gesture . Although she urged psychometri-
cians to keep abreast of clinical psychology, her vagueness on the matter of what 
in particular in that vast area was worth attending to reflects another dissociation 
of theory and practice in American psychology, namely, the schism between 
psychology and psychiatry, or even the parallel split between academic and 
clinical psychology (splits that have their own political and intellectual roots) . 
Ever since psychiatry emerged from Bedlam and the scientific dark ages, the 
dominant theoretical perspective has been psychoanalytic, Freudian. Strangely, 
in spite of the antipathy with which psychodynamic theory is viewed by Ameri-
can academic psychologists, across the hall their colleagues in clinical psychol-
ogy honor it as the pre-eminent theoretical system (Garfield & Kurtz, 1974, 
1977). The extension of Freud's work made by such investigators as Hartmann, 
Spitz, Jacobson, Mahler and now the younger generation of ego-psychologists 
has produced a most impressive and far-reaching psychological theory of human 
development and behavior (both "normal" and pathological) . Permit me to 
declare myself. Coupled with neurophysiology and behavioral genetics, the psy-
choanalytic perspective represents our best hope for a comprehensive and useful 
account of the development and psychology of human beings. And yet, the link 
between psychoanalysis and psychometrics is virtuall y nonexistent. 
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Not only is any connection between psychoanalytic psychology and psycho-
metrics imposs ible to di scern , but the latter sometimes rather grandly imagines 
that it has di sproved the former. A methodological critique or a factor analysis of 
Rorschach responses , or a horse race between stati sti ca l and clinical predictions 
will not deal with the chall enge that neo-analytic ego psychology presents to 
empirical methodology. It is a curious fact unknown to nearly all who cite Meehl 
(1954) as the refutation of " clinica l insight " (and then by implication "psycho-
analytic theory") that Paul Meehl 's theoretical leanings are se lf-proclaimed as 
psychoanalytic. 2 This is not the place to defend psychoanalysis agai nst the 
charge that it is " unsc ientific"-a charge made about equally often as the 
charge that it is false, the two charges be ing contradictory, at least by Popper's 
criterion of what constitutes a sc ientifi c proposition. The defense of the scientific 
status of psychoanalysis was presented some time ago in Hook (1959) . I only 
wish to add here that it is scientific in precisely the most signifi cant way and in 
the way in which too many psychological theories are inadequate, viz., the 
conclusions of psychoanalysis (e.g., the meaning of dreams, parapraxes , the 
operation of defense mechanisms, and the like) are " risky " propositions (in the 
Popperian sense), meaning that they are not independentl y derivable from com-
mon sense. 
Psychoanalytic Psychology 
It is my opinion that psychoanalyti c psychology, particularly in its modern 
forms, represents the most significant challenge and opportunity that testing and 
measurement in the soc ial and behav ioral sc iences could ass ume. It promises to 
change fundamentally the way in which psychometrics is pursued outside the 
narrow area of assessing aptitUde and learning. If studied seriously , psycho-
analytic psychology could lead to new techniques of observation and at least new 
concepts of the relat ionship between manifest behavior and the enduring psy-
chology of the individual. 
I see thi s possible relationship only vaguely myse lf. Perhaps an example or 
two will he lp bring these generalities into better focus. 
The measurement of "self-concept " is one of the most active areas of psy-
chometric concern , and yet the construct as embodied in modern tests is a hoary 
and naive thing scarce ly developed any further than William James's ( 1890) 
thinking nearly a century ago. In Wiley's (1961) famous treatments of self-
concept measurement , though she treats the theoretical foundations of the con-
struct with respect, they are revealed to be littl e more than vague, commonsen-
sical sketches of the conditioning of Philistine self-sati sfaction by a pair of bland 
2" 1 am confident that psychoanalyti c concepts will be around after rubber band theory, transac-
tional theory, attachment theory, labe ling theory, di ssonance theory, attribution theory, and so on , 
have subsided into a state of innocuous desuetude .... At the very least, psychoanalys is is an 
interesting theory, which is more than I can say about some of the ' theories' that are currentl y 
fashionab le" (Meehl, 1978 , p. 8 17). 
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parents molding little lumps of clay with praise and kisses. One current " theo-
ry," which is attracting psychometric attention (Marsh, Smith, & Barnes, 1983), 
is a seven-part model of the self-concept: The self-concept is hypothes ized to 
comprise (a) the physical ability self, (b) the appearance self, (c) the peer rela-
tions self, (d) the parent relations self, (e) the reading self, (0 the mathematics 
self, and (g) the school subjects self. In a IO,OOO-word research report on this 
theory , one reads of factor analysis, multitraitlmultimethod matrices, self-re-
ports versus ratings by others, discriminant validity , divergent validity , halo 
bias, social desirability response sets, and on and on . About the only reference to 
psychological theory is, "An implicit assumption of most theorists is that self-
concept is multifacted" (p. 334). Further, it is said to be formed out of experi-
ence with the environment and interactions with "significant others." Clearly, 
this is a picture of psychometrics running amuck! Big methodological guns 
loaded with folk wisdom and truisms. This factor analytic mincing could go on 
forever; we could , of course, equally well discover ' 'automobile self-concept," 
"favorite football team self-concept," or even "preferred Baskin-Robbins fla-
vor self-concept. " 
The problem with this empirical hustle and bustle is that it is thoroughly 
innocent of any serious theory about the psychological sense of self: how it 
develops, what it is, how it can become sick, how to make it well. How ade-
quately do the Rogerian theory and the other commonsense accounts of "self-
concept" stand up to the " risky " tests of explanatory scope which alone will 
separate idle psychologizing from respectable theory, such risky tests as account-
ing for the ephemeral sense of identity of a thoroughly decompensated schi zo-
phrenic , the sense of gender identity so confused as to cause a man wilfully to 
multilate hi s body surgically and chemically , the dangerous line between 
positively cathected self-representations and neurotic narcissism , the sp lintered 
selves of a multiple personality , or the more ordinary feelings of depression and 
emptiness in a child whose every act prompts nothing but praise and reward from 
the "significant others" of his environment? Unless our theories reach this far, 
they are in jeopardy of being not so much false as uselessly redundant with 
ordinary common sense. 
It will surprise many to learn perhaps that one can scarcely find any reference 
in all of Freud 's voluminous writings to a "self-concept," and that the term does 
not even appear in the lex icographic bible of psychoanalysis , Laplanche and 
Pontalis's The Language of Psychoanalysis (1973). Furthermore, in the writings 
of the neo-Freudians , those things that William James once thought of and the 
person-in-the-street now thinks of as the "self-concept" have been resolved into 
an extremely complex braid of developmental strands (including , among other 
things , identity formation a la Mahler) through stages of autism, merged self and 
object representations , differentiated representations, "practicing" and rap-
prochement subphases to gender identify and separation-individuation; or (a fa 
Kohut) the formation of the ego ideal from disillusionment with the grandiose 
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self whose roots reach to the stage of infantile primary narc issism; or (a La S. 
Freud , A. Freud , Mahler, Jacobson and nearly every neo-Freudian) the construc-
tion of personal identity through identification with the loved or hated object. 
Neo-Freudian ego psychology has made exc iting advances in those areas referred 
to colloquially as "self-concept" or "self-esteem"; the best didactic treatment 
of the past forty years of this research is the impress ive two-volume work by 
Gertrude and Rubin Blanck, Ego Psychology: Theory and Practice (1974) and 
Ego Psychology II: PsychoanaLytic DeveLopmental PsychoLogy (1 979). This cor-
pus of research can be commended to the attention of psychometricians; it has 
been attended to by at least one such, but more about that later. 
In her summation on the state of self-concept measurement , Ruth Wi ley 
( 196 1, pp. 3 17 ff.) criticized much of the psychometric work she reviewed on 
account of its theoretical naivete. She was more generous than I might have been 
in the same situation (she being rather charitable toward some trivial concep-
tuali zations), and her own grasp of the role of "self" in psychodynamic theory 
was weak. Nonetheless, she did identi fy the yawning gap between psychometric 
practice and psychoanalytic theory: " ... certain psychologists have thought 
that self-concept research yields weak or equi vocal results because the theory 
does not systematically include the unconscious se lf concept, or other uncon-
sc ious cogn itive and dynamic processes" (Wiley, 196 1, p. 3 19). Although she 
thereafter goes on to place an unhealthy emphas is on the criterion of predictive 
validity for deciding whether new and unusual constructs (like the Freudian 
unconscious) should be allowed into the test battery, her sense of the seriousness 
of the omiss ion of the unconscious from consideration of "self-concept" seems 
completely justified . Indeed, the situation is typical of academic psychology's 
long relationship with Freudian psychology. Everyw here theorists and practi-
tioners wish to cook the Freudian omelet without breaking the Freudian eggs. It 
cannot be done; the unconsc ious (whose ex istence is proved daily in our actions 
and nightly in our dreams) is the cornerstone of psychoanalysis and it cannot be 
locked in the closet like some shameful secret if psychology (and psychometrics) 
are to form any meaningful connection with psychoanalysis. 
Consider Jane Loevinger's (Loevinger & Wessler, 1970) work on the mea-
surement of ego development. Loevinger, an earl y-day quantitative psychologist 
and psychometrician, has spent the last three decades engaged in an ambitious 
attempt to develop measures of some of those emotional-cognitive processes 
talked about by the neo-Freudians, and which she covers with the title "ego 
development." Her efforts took off from a thorough understanding of traditional 
psychometric technique and its deficiencies for capturing what the ego psychol-
ogists were writing about: (a) there ex ists no one-to-one correspondence between 
a particular behavioral act and a level of ego development; (b) many strands of 
ego development occur simultaneously and one bit of behavior may refl ect more 
than one strand ; (c) no error-free way ex ists of distinguishing signs of develop-
mental levels from signs of non-developmental corre lates; (d) each individual 
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di splays behavior at more than one leve l of ego maturity; (e) a behaviora l s ign 
may be di scriminating in only one direction; and so on . Ironica lly, the one 
difficulty that Loevinger clearly identified and sought to overcome in her cho ice 
of psychometric format (sentence completion) and the vo luminous and demand-
ing scoring guides is prec isely the point on which her critics allege that she 
departed from psychoanalytic theory . Loevinger wrote : 
... no behavioral tas k can be guaranteed to displ ay just what one wants to know 
about ego level. Neither a structured test nor an unstructured test carries a guar'an-
tee. If the test is structured, the investi gator is projecting his own frame of reference 
rather than tapping the frame of reference of hi s subjects, which is the very thing 
that reveals their ego level. If the test is unstructured, one cannot control what the 
subject will choose to reveal (p. 9). 
Loevinger must have fe lt she was steering a sa fe middle course through this 
dilemma by choos ing incomplete sentences to be completed by the examinee 
(e .g., " When I get mad .. . ," " When they avoid me . . . ," " When they 
talked about sex , I . . . " ) and by struggling heroically with the free- form pro-
ductions that result ; but Gertrude Blanck ( 1976) , whose understanding of Freud 
and the neo-Freudians is widely honored , bli stered Loevinger for her misunder-
standing o f theory and for her choice of method: " The methodology . . . is 
simplistic, not alone by comparison (with psychoanalytic observati onal studies) , 
but in its own right. Sentence completion as a research too l cannot be taken 
seriously because it re lies on consc ious responses and overl ooks the ir uncon-
sc ious determinants" (p . 803). 
I can agree enthusiastically at a general leve l with what Mischel ca lled for in 
hi s 1977 paper , " On the Future of Personality Measurement ," vi z . , a broader 
assessment of persons fun ctioning in their environment. I can e ndorse whole-
heartedl y and accept as my own hi s prediction that, 
In the future, measurement hopefull y will be directed increas ingly at the anal ys is of 
naturally occurring behav iors observed in the interactions among people in real -li fe 
settings . . . . The future of personality measurement will be brighter if we can 
move beyond our favorite pencil-and-paper and laboratory measures to include 
direct observation as well as unobtrusive nonreactive meas ures to study li ves where 
they are reall y lived and not merely where the researcher finds it convenient to look 
at them (p. 248). 
Hear! Hear! And yet. . .. What kind of peeping does Mische l have in mind? 
And does he realize that if the dignity of the indiv iduals invo lved is respected , 
they will ultimately be the source of information about their own lives and what it 
is like to li ve them; the assessment of personality might better resemble a psychi-
atric interview than a bugged roo m with one-way mirrors . Although Mischel 
seems to recogni ze thi s somewhat and says that personality measurement must 
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rely increasingly on self-reports, he finally (and di sappointingly from my per-
spective) asserts his identity as an American academic psychologist and repudi-
ates the unconsc ious, even suggesting ob liquely that a couple of experiments and 
his own textbook have disproved its ex istence. Lord! Don ' t these psychologists 
ever sleep? And if they do , do they never dream? 
A "Reflection on Schoolboy Psychology" 
It is with regard to the role of unconscious processes that the relationship be-
tween psychoanalysis and psychometrics will be determined. If psychometrics 
continues to view the unconsc ious with arm's length suspicion as something 
unsavory or pathological or unscientific, then the opportunities for useful coll ab-
oration will be few. 
It is, I believe, through a largely unconsc ious process of identification that we 
become truly educated . We grow to be like those we love . Our teachers g ive us 
an identity- not facts, not even a significant amount of whatever go lden things 
lie at the highest leve l of Bloom's taxonomy . We are, each of us, living out li ves 
that we took from someone e lse, someone we have loved and whose image we 
hold close by be ing what they were. Freud (1 9 14) said as much in his "Some 
Reflections on Schoolboy Psychology." 
... it is hard to decide whether what affected us more and was of greater impor-
tance to us was our concern with the scie nccs that we we re taught or with the 
personalities of our teachers.. . We courted them or turned our backs on them , 
we imagined sympathies and antipathies in them which probably had no ex istence, 
we studied the ir charac ters and on the irs we formed or misformed our own . Thcy 
ca lled up our fiercies t opposit ion and forced us to complete submiss ion; we peered 
into thei r littlc weaknesses , and took pride in the ir excellences . .. we can now 
understand our relation to our schoo lmas ters. Thcse men, not all of whom were in 
fact fathers themselves , became our substitute fathers (p . 242). 
There is in these instances of unconsc ious identification more about the true 
course of education ,3 the way it shapes and molds and occas ionally transforms 
us , than there is in all the behavioral objectives and mastery qui zzes and standard-
ized tests that ever were written . Children take more from the adults of the ir 
world than knowledge or training or even chromosomes. Through a process of 
identifi cation , which springs large ly fro m unconsc ious motives, they take a way 
of li ving that reaches to every corner of the ir li ves. The dynamics of identifica-
tion form some of the more interesting themes in that unstudied genre of liter-
'The true aims of educati on, as Michae l Oakeshott [1 972 , p . 40j charac teri zed them , are". 
initi ati on into the mysteries of a human condition; the g ift of se lf-k nowledge and of a sati sfy ing 
inte llec tu al and mora l identity. " 
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ature perhaps best ca lled " teacher fiction " (e. g ., the relationship of Godfrey St. 
Peter and Tom Outland in Willa Cather's The Professor' s House, or the loathe-
some dynamics in Muriel Spark 's The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie). We must look 
in such places as these (the unconscious origins of identi fication, for one) with 
such peculiar instruments as interviews and free ly flowing association and , yes, 
even dreams , if we wish to find the secrets of how children come to assume their 
individual adult forms. 
There are two sides to this matter of the enduring impress ions that education 
sometimes leaves. I spoke of one side, that seen by the marble. Now let the 
sculptor speak . Another man , Loren Eiseley , who after publishing The Immense 
Journey was acclaimed sc ientist and poet by the likes of Auden, once described4 
the view from the lectern: 
Now , for many years an educator, I often feel the need to seek out a quiet park 
bench to survey mentally that vast and nameless river of students which has poured 
under my hands . In pain I have meditated: "This man is dead- a suicide . Was it I , 
a ll unknowing ly, who directed , in some black hour, his hand upon the gun?" 
"This man is a liar and a cheat. Where did my stroke go wrong?" Or there comes 
to memory the man who , after long endeavors , returned happily to the farm from 
which he had come. Did I serve him , if not in the world' s eye, well ? Or the r ichly 
endowed young poet whom I she ltered from hi s father's wrath- was I pampering 
or defendin g- and at the right or the wrong moment in hi s life? Contingency, 
contingency, and each day by word or deed the chi sel falling true or blind upon the 
future of some boy or g irl. 
Ours is an ill -paid profess ion and we have our share of fools . We, too , like the 
generat ion before us, are the cracked, the battered , the malformed products of 
remoter chi sels shaping the most obsti nate substance in the universe: the substance 
of man . Someone has to do it , but perhaps it might be done more kindly, more 
prec isely , to the extent that we are conscious ly aware of what we do- even if that 
thought sometimes congeals our hearts with terror. Or, if we were more consc ious 
of our task , would our hands shake or grow immobilized upon the chisel? 
I do not know. I know only that in these late faint-hearted years I sometimes 
pause with my hand upon the knob before I go forth into the classroom. I am 
afflicted in thi s fashi on because I have come to fo llow Dewey in hi s remarks that 
" nature is seen to be marked by hi stories." As an evolutionist I am fam iliar wi th 
that vast sprawling emergent , the universe, and its even more fantastic shadow , 
life. Stranger still , however, is the record of the artis t who creates the symbols by 
which we li ve . As Dewey has again antic ipated , " No mechanically exact sc ience 
of an individual is poss ible. An individual is a hi story unique in character. " 
" But ," he remarks, " const ituents of an individual are known when they are 
regarded not as qualitative, but as stati stical constants derived from a series of 
operat ions" ( 1962 , p . 25). 
41n a book ded icated to Le tt a May Clark , Eisc ley's English teacher at Univers ity of Nebraska 
High School: The Mind As Nalilre. NO.5 in the John Dewey Society Lectureshi p, New York , Harper 
& Row, 1962. 
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Eiseley went on to examine creativity: that enigma to which the 
modern student of educational psychology is devoting more and more attention " 
(1962, p . 28). In 1962 when Eiseley wrote these words, educational psychol-
ogists did indeed aspire to measure and explore such "stati stical constants" as 
creativity and motivation and trust and perseverance and "social competence ." I 
am old enough to remember when psychometricians spoke unashamedly of their 
aspirations to capture more of human experience than the IQ. Now they seldom 
confess such ambitions, content instead , it seems, to refine endlessly the mathe-
matical foundations of measuring nothing in particul ar. And this concerns me 
more than anything else about the present condition of tes ting and its future: that 
its disciples no longer share any sense of wonder or fasc ination about the devel-
opment of thought , the nurture of talent , the mysteries of human personality . 
Without the aspiration to understand human growth and behavior, testing will 
drift further from those sc iences that keep such aspi rations ali ve. 
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